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A new simple model of diffusion of innovations in a so-
cial network with upgrading costs is introduced. Agents are
characterized by a single real variable, their technological
level. According to local information agents decide whether
to upgrade their level or not balancing their possible benefit
with the upgrading cost. A critical point where technolog-
ical avalanches display a power-law behavior is also found.
This critical point is characterized by a macroscopic observ-
able that turns out to optimize technological growth in the
stationary state. Analytical results supporting our findings
are found for the globally coupled case.
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There has recently been much interest in modeling so-
cial and economical systems from a physical point of view
[1–3]. Most of these studies have fallen into two classes:
statistical analysis of time series and agent based micro-
scopic models. Among the latter, most of them have
been proposed in order to mimic financial markets be-
havior [4–6]. Despite this, several authors have, on their
turn, developed models to simulate other sort of social
behaviors such as the adoption of competing products
[7], innovation and collaboration [8,9] or group decision-
making [10]. The main goal of all these models is to
reproduce real world behavior while simplifying the the-
oretical models retaining as less parameters as possible.
Keeping this in mind, we have tackled the problem
of diffusion of innovations in a social network. In order
to understand the complex behavior of technology adop-
tion dynamics one should consider how the stimulus for
change spreads by gradual local interaction through a so-
cial network. Most of the times, these “waves” of change
come in terms of intermittent bursts separating relatively
long periods of quiescence, in other words, the system
exhibits “punctuated equilibrium” behavior. Certainly
some technologies, like cellular phones or VCR’s, seem
to lurk in the background for years and then suddenly
explode into mass use [11].
There are two main mechanisms involved in the diffu-
sion of innovations in a social network that any math-
ematical model should take into account. On the one
hand, there is a pressure for adopting a new product or
technology coming from marketing campaigns and mass
media. These external processes are essentially indepen-
dent of the social network structure and one can view
their effects as a random independent process on the in-
dividuals (hereafter called agents). On the other hand,
there is the influence of the surrounding agents who de-
fine the social network. Once an agent decides to adopt
a new technology, those who are in contact with him can
evaluate the new payoff the agent has got from acquir-
ing the new technology and compare it with their cur-
rent benefits. This propagating mechanism stands for
interpersonal, such as word of mouth, communication
processes. By balancing the payoff increment with the
associated upgrading cost, they may decide to adopt, or
not, the new technology. In this way, the local flux of
information plays a key role in diffusing new products.
It is important to notice that we are not considering any
compatibility constraint among the agents. Links only
account for the flux of information among agents who
decide to take an action or another for their exclusively
own benefit.
In this letter we propose a simple model of diffusion
of technological innovations with costs. In the simplest
version of the model, a population of N agents lie in
a one-dimensional chain with periodic boundary condi-
tions. Each agent i is characterized by the real vari-
able ai. This variable stands for their technological level,
that is, the higher ai, the more advanced (technologi-
cally speaking) he is . We will assume that the payoff
that an agent receives from possessing a certain techno-
logical level is simply proportional to it. The model is
then simulated as follows:
(i) at each time step, a randomly selected agent ai
updates his technological level
ai → ai +∆i, (1)
where ∆i is a random variable exponentially distributed
with mean λ, that is, p(∆) = e−∆/λ/λ. This driving
process accounts for the external pressure that may lead
to a spontaneous new technology adoption by any of the
population agents. In all numerical simulations shown in
this letter we have used λ = 1/2. However, all results are
robust against other noise choices, as long as they have
a finite variance.
(ii) all agents jǫΓ(i) (Γ(i) being the set of neighbors
of agent i) decide whether they also want to upgrade or
not, according to the following rule
ai − aj ≥ C ⇒ aj → ai, (2)
where C (cost) is a constant parameter that stands for
the price an agent must pay in order to upgrade his tech-
nology as well as his personal “resistance” to change.
(iii) if any aj has decided to also upgrade his level, we
let their neighbors also choose whether to upgrade or not.
This procedure is repeated until no one else wants to up-
grade, concluding a technological avalanche. Whenever
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FIG. 1. Technological profiles (N = 1024) for several val-
ues of C in the stationary state. For C = 0.5 the profile is
almost flat (synchronized state) with everybody sharing the
same technology. As we increase C the profile gets noisier and
plateaus (agents that, at some point have shared the same
technology) become less common. For C = 5 the technologi-
cal profile is very random.
an agent ai decides to upgrade, their neighbors become
aware of the new technology and balance the profit they
may obtain in case of also adopting it (ai − aj) with
its cost C. It may well happen that if the technologi-
cal innovation spontaneously adopted by the seed of the
avalanche is high enough compared with the cost, the
avalanche may end up spanning a large portion of the
population.
According to the cost value C it is possible to distin-
guish several regimes. In Fig. 1 we can see some ex-
amples of the technology profile (the interface defined by
the technology level of all agents) for several values of
the cost C. For C ≪ 1, once there is an external random
update, a system size avalanche is immediately triggered
so that all agents end up sharing the same technological
level, or in other words, the system is always in an almost
synchronized state. For values of C ≫ 1 upgrading is so
expensive that agents do not care about their neighbors
technology, and large avalanches are not triggered any
more (almost all avalanches are of size 1). In this regime
the technological profile is quite rough (actually, in the
limit C → ∞ we should recover the random deposition
model [12]). In between these two regimes, there is a
region showing a rich dynamics where one finds techno-
logical avalanches of all possible sizes. Actually, for some
values of C the probability density of having an avalanche
of size s shows a power-law behavior
P (s) ∼ s−τ . (3)
Fig. 2 shows P (s) for several system sizes and C = 3.
The appearance of power-law distributed quantities is
usually related to the existence of some critical point.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to locate the critical point by
looking at P (s) since finite-size effects provide a whole
region of the parameter space where P (s) behavior is
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FIG. 2. Plot of the probability density of having a tech-
nological avalanche of size s for C = 3 in log-log scale. We
find that P (s) ∼ s−τ with τ = 1.72. The peaks at the end of
each curve are due to finite size effects. Numerical simulations
have been averaged over 108 avalanches
compatible with a power-law. Actually, the same prob-
lem appears in some SOC [13] models and the question of
whether there is critical point or a whole critical region
in some parameter space has been largely debated [14].
We need another signature of criticality that may help
us in locating the critical point.
A possible answer comes from the social interpretation
of the model. Social science researchers usually work
with aggregated data such as the adopting curve [15],
that is, the evolution in time of the total number of peo-
ple who adopts a certain product or technology. Anal-
ogously, in our model we can set an arbitrary threshold
ath and then calculate how many agents posses a tech-
nology a > ath as the upgrading process goes on. Let us
label φ the fraction of agents with a > ath. Fig. 3 shows
three adopting curves for three different values of C. For
C = 1.25 large avalanches (made of a lot of agents acquir-
ing the same new product or technology) are triggered.
In this way, the technological profile advances uniformly
and, the system must pay a lot of costs. This situation
is clearly inefficient. In the plot this is reflected by the
fact that the curve for C = 1.25 is the last one to reach
ath (at least one of the agents), but once it begins the
whole population crosses ath very fast (because of the
uniform advance). On the other hand, for C = 3.5 very
few avalanches are triggered, meaning that the profile
grows in a very non-uniform way, and its fluctuations are
quite important. That is why the C = 3.5 curve begins
crossing the threshold ath earlier than the case C = 1.25.
However, it takes much more time the whole population
to cross the threshold and it is clearly inefficient in terms
of how many times a cost is paid. As result, there is an
intermediate value of C (C = 2.5 in the plot) where this
weighted growth process is optimized and the φ curve
is always greater than for larger and smaller cost values.
That corresponds to the critical region, where avalanches
of all possible sizes are triggered. In other words, there
are some intermediate C values that let the population
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FIG. 3. Evolution of the fraction of agents with a > ath = 3
for N = 1024 and several values of C as the number of up-
grades increases. Numerical simulations have been averaged
over 1000 initial configurations. In this example the curve for
C = 2.5 is always above the others.
reach a given average technological level with a minimum
number of upgrades (and their associated costs). There-
fore, we can speak of an efficient cost region leading to
an optimal growth rate.
We can quantify this effect by computing the so-called
mean velocity of progress [8] defined as ratio of the total
technology advance and the total number of upgrades. It
can also be computed as ρ = 〈H〉 / 〈s〉, where 〈H〉 stands
for the average total technological advance induced by
an avalanche (the interface area increment caused by an
avalanche) and 〈s〉 is the average avalanche size. This
quantity, ρ, gives an idea of how fast the technological
profile grows. Fig. 4 shows several plots of ρ against C
for several system sizes. The first thing one can see is that
ρ has a maximum for an intermediate value of C. More-
over, ρmax scales with the system size as ρmax ∼ N
0.20(1),
diverging in the thermodynamic limit N → ∞. The lo-
cation of ρmax allows us to define the finite size critical
point of the model CcN . A proper and detailed char-
acterization of this critical point will be published else-
where. It is also possible to exactly calculate the as-
symptotic value of ρ. For C ≪ 1, almost all avalanches
are of the size of the system 〈s〉 ∼ N , and the total ad-
vance induced by them is, in average, Nλ. Therefore,
ρ → λ. Moreover, for C ≫ 1 the avalanches are of unit
size 〈s〉 ∼ 1 and advance λ, so that ρ→ λ as well.
In the view of all this, one can assert that it is near the
critical point where the technological profile grows more
efficiently. This leads to the following paradoxal result:
upgrading costs should be neither cheap nor expensive
in order to have an optimal technological growth. Obvi-
oulsy, our concept of efficiency is related to the number
of times a cost is paid, that is, from the point of view of
the population but not the companies who sell the prod-
ucts. Sellers will always look for a scenario where agents
acquire as many new products as often as possible.
In order to complete our study, we have also analysed
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FIG. 4. ρ as a function of C for several system sizes. At
the extremes C → 0 and C → ∞, the value of ρ goes
to < ∆i >= λ = 1/2. There is a peak, ρmax, that di-
verges in thermodynamic limit N → ∞. In the inset we
plot ρmax against system size N . Dashed line shows the fit
ρmax ∼ N
0.20(1).
the globally coupled case, where some analytical results
have been found.
In the globally coupled version of the model informa-
tion about the technological level ai of all agents is avail-
able to any agent. Now, agents technological level is con-
fined in a band of width C since whenever there is a dif-
ference a− a′ ≥ C between any two agents, the one with
the lowest level immediately adopts the highest techno-
logical level. Moreover, the system still displays a peak
for the mean velocity of progress ρ as Fig. 5 shows. What
is, indeed, also quite amazing, is that the globally cou-
pled case also has also a power-law avalanche probability
distribution P (s) at the efficient region (Fig. 5).
In order to give an estimation of ρ in the station-
ary state, let us make some mean-field assumption (that
is, restricting to average values and neglecting fluctua-
tions). Let us assume that the agents technological levels
are uniformly distributed over the band of width C, so
that there is a density of levels N/C. In order to keep
things simple we also assume that random spontaneous
updates are of fixed size λ. Then, there is going to be
an avalanche whenever any of the agents having a tech-
nological level a ∈ [C − λ,C](where the origin has been
set at the base of the band) decides to, spontaneously,
adopt a new technology. This will happen with a proba-
bility λ/C every time step. The agents involved in such
avalanche will be those who lie in the lowest region of
the band a ∈ [0, λ], and, in average, half of them will
take part in the avalanche, so that the number of agents
involved is Nλ/2C. These agents will advance their tech-
nological levels by C. Therefore, after T time steps, in
average there will be Tλ/C avalanches and T (1 − λ/C)
simple spontaneous updates. Now, we can calculate H ,
the global technological advance after T time steps, as
well as S the total number of upgrades (spontaneous and
induced by the avalanches)
3
H =
Tλ
C
(
Nλ
2C
C
)
+ T
(
1−
λ
C
)
λ (4)
S = T +
Tλ
C
Nλ
2C
. (5)
Then ρ is imply given by the ratio H/S. In terms of
the adimensional variables ρ/λ and µ ≡ λ/C we find the
relation
ρ/λ =
µN/2 + 1− µ
1 + µ2N/2
. (6)
This formula holds whenever λ > C, otherwise the above
assumptions are not valid, and one trivially finds that
ρ = λ. Notice that in the limit C → ∞ we also recover
ρ → λ. Fig. 5 shows a comparison between Eq. (6)
and simulation data. Although the formula gives a cor-
rect estimation for C → 0 and C → ∞, there is some
discrepancy near the peak of the ρ. A plausible explana-
tion for this is the existence of large fluctuations (as Fig.
(5) shows) so that a mean-field approach only provides a
crude estimation of ρ.
Now, it is possible to study the asymptotic behavior
of ρmax that results from maximizing Eq. (6). We find
that
µcN =
−2N −
√
2N(N2 + 2N − 4)
N(2−N)
. (7)
In the thermodynamic limit N → ∞, µcN → 0 and
CcN → ∞. Therefore, for the globally coupled case
the critical point goes to infinity and ρmax diverges as
ρmax ∼ N .
In conclusion, we have presented a simple model of dif-
fusion of innovations in a social network displaying rich
dynamics ranging from global synchronization to criti-
cal behavior. Costs are responsible of blocking the flux
of information over the network, but, at the same time,
they are necessary to guarantee an optimal growth of the
technology profile. In order to show this, we have com-
puted the value of ρ, mean velocity of progress, a quan-
tity that is maximized at the critical point of the model.
We have also analytically solved a mean-field version of
the globally coupled case and showed the existence of a
maximum value of ρ that diverges in the thermodynamic
limit. Also in this case, a power-law avalanche distribu-
tion leading to a critical behavior has also been found at
the efficient region of the model. Therefore, one of the
most interesting things of our model is that all its most
intriguing features are qualitatively the same regardless
of the systems connectivity.
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FIG. 5. ρ for different system sizes as a function of C for
the globally coupled case. Dashed line stands for Eq. (6). In
the inset we plot the avalanche probability distribution P (s)
around the peak of the ρ. For the simulations we have used
λ = 0.1.
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